By: Christina Fernandez
The Fair Housing Amendments Act, bars housing discrimination based on one’s disability or affiliation with one who has a disability.[1]Section 3604(f)(1) of the FHA makes it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of one’s disability or handicap, and §3604(f)(3) makes it unlawful to refuse “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, or practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”[2] Often times, these “reasonable accommodations” take the form of making building modifications in order to make a building wheel-chair accessible, or are as simple as a change in the way that a housing provider communicates information for those with hearing or sight impairments.[3]What exactly qualifies as a ‘reasonable accommodation,’ however, has often been overlooked and undermined in our courtrooms.
For Albert Schaw (“Schaw”), a reasonable accommodation was asked for in a different form.[4]Schaw, a quadriplegic, applied for a home with Habitat for Humanity of Citrus County (“Habitat”).[5]Schaw’s primary source of income comes from social security disability benefits, which in totality, fell just below the required annual income threshold to qualify for one of their homes.[6]Shaw requested a reasonable accommodation that would allow him to supplement his annual income with either food stamps or a letter memorializing the financial support he received from his family on a monthly basis in order to reach the threshold requirement.[7]Schaw was not asking for the requirement to be waived, rather, just that they accept other forms of income he received to qualify as income. Habitat argued that the request went beyond the “necessary to afford an equal opportunity” standard under the FHA because it “went solely to his financial condition—not his disability.”[8]The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Habitat.[9]Schaw appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.[10]
The Eleventh Circuit filed their decision on September 18, 2019. The Court vacated and remanded as to Schaw’s “reasonable accommodation” argument, holding that the district court failed to consider first whether the request was facially reasonable, and then whether Habitat has shown that the accommodation would result in an undue burden.[11]Judge Newsom, writing the opinion of the panel, also held that the district court had “strictly separatedSchaw’s ‘financial condition’ from his ‘disability.’[12]He writes:
we think it significant that federal law lists “working” as a major life activity alongside “seeing, hearing, speaking, and walking.” It would be odd, then, if the Act deemed “necessary” those accommodations that “alleviate[] the effects of” an inability to see, hear, speak, or walk, but not those that alleviate the effects of an inability to work.[13]
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion emphasizes and captures a moreholistic view of the way the law addresses disability—it’s not just about the physical characteristics or Shaw’s inability to move around, but how this inability affects every aspect of his life, including the strain it puts on his ability to supplement his income. It also takes great strides in addressing how courts should be approaching “reasonable accommodations” under the FHA, urging courts to be careful in their analyses of the “low facial-reasonableness bar” Plaintiffs are required to meet to demonstrate that their request is reasonable in light of the restriction’s primary goal. In all, the opinion represents a win for disabled individuals seeking accommodations to fundamental human rights.
[1]42 U.S.C. § 3601 et. seq.
[2]§§ 3604(f)(1), 3604(3)(B).
[3]U.S. Dept. of Housing, Joint Statement of The Department Of Housing And Urban Development and The Department of Justice Reasonable Accommodations Under The Fair Housing Act (May 17, 2004).
[4]See Schaw v. Habitat for Humanity of Citrus County, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2017).
[5]Id.
[6]Id.
[7]Id.
[8]Schaw v. Habitat for Humanity of Citrus County, No. 5:16-cv-00311-JSM-PRL 2019 WL 4458370 at *1 (11th Cir. September 18, 2019).
[9]Id.
[10]Id.
[11]Id. at *6.
[12]Id.
[13]Id. at *8. (citing42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b).)
