By: Jacqueline Havran
Florida executive leaders are planning on becoming the first state to eliminate all vaccine mandates. Framed as a victory for individual liberty and medical freedom,[1] the proposal is a dramatic departure from decades of public health policy and practice.[2] One may ask how can executive actors lawfully dismantle core public health protections and who bears the risk when these protections are not enforced? Florida’s Department of Health (“DOH”) has the power to remove some mandates through delegated authority, and its attempt to do so has exposed a gap in the public health law framework that has serious implications for health equity and administrative legitimacy.[3] Florida’s proposed vaccine mandate ban represents more than a policy change. It illustrates how administrative discretion can be used to hollow out a legislatively endorsed public health framework while redistributing health risk onto vulnerable populations.[4]
Florida’s Delegated Authority
Florida’s proposal goes beyond vaccine skepticism and pandemic politics. Under Florida law, vaccine mandates are imposed through a combination of statutes enacted by the Legislature,[5] and rules administered by the Department of Health.[6] While only the Legislature may repeal statutory mandates,[7] the mandates enforced through DOH regulations,[8] fall under the authority of the Surgeon General.[9] As a result, if the Legislature declines to repeal the statutory mandates, executive officials may still substantially weaken Florida’s vaccination framework by removing those enforced administratively.[10]
Under Florida law, the DOH exists to administer and enforce the Legislature’s public health framework. The DOH is responsible for the protection and promotion of the health of all residents.[11] Chapter 381 of the Florida Statutes authorizes the DOH to adopt, repeal, and amend rules related to its public health mission, which explicitly includes childhood immunization and communicable disease prevention programs.[12] The DOH is further appointed with the duty to administer and enforce laws and rules relating to the control of communicable diseases and coordinating disease prevention efforts across federal, state, and local officials.[13] Most importantly, Florida statutes require the DOH to conduct programs for the prevention and control of vaccine-preventable diseases, directing the DOH to “ensure that all children in this state are immunized against vaccine-preventable diseases.”[14]
These statutes establish a coherent legislative scheme of disease prevention and immunization as core public health objectives and delegates to the DOH the authority to implement this framework through rulemaking. Under Florida Statute § 120.536, agency rules must function to implement the statutory purpose, not to diminish it.[15] Thus, selectively removing administratively enforced vaccine requirements risks converting this delegated authority into a mechanism for undermining the Legislature’s public health framework.
However, the DOH is not required to enforce vaccines beyond those explicitly mandated by statute. Florida Statute § 1003.22, distinguishes between the immunizations specified by statute and those determined by DOH rules.[16] The statutory language suggest that the Legislature intentionally left certain vaccine mandates to the discretion of the DOH. Additionally, the Administrative Procedure Act permits agencies to repeal their own rules by following the specified procedures.[17]
Although this move by the DOH is lawful, it raises an administrative law concern. Public health statutes and regulations are designed to operate as a system.[18] While the Legislature delegated discretion to determine which additional vaccines should be mandated, that delegation was embedded within a statutory framework that has repeatedly emphasized required immunizations and disease prevention. Delegated rulemaking authority is meant to facilitate administrative enforcement, not selective dismantling for ideological reasons.[19] Removing mandates without legislative support, may frustrate the statute’s core purpose. Courts have long cautioned that agencies may not exercise delegated authority in a manner that is inconsistent with legislative objectives, fundamentally restructures statutory schemes, or resolves major policy questions without clear authorization.[20] Florida’s proposed mandate ban tests the boundaries of its delegated authority in public health policy.
Structural Protections and Redistribution of Risk
Vaccine mandates have long been understood as a foundation of public health governance in the United States.[21] Unlike voluntary health measures, mandates operate as structural protections, ensuring high vaccination coverage regardless of social determinants of health.[22] School-entry vaccination requirements, in particular, function as equalizers: they ensure that children who may lack consistent access to medical care will be vaccinated while simultaneously safeguarding individuals who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons.[23]
For some families, who are more likely to have consistent access to healthcare providers, flexible work schedules, and reliable transportation, vaccination may remain routine even without mandates. In contrast, without school-entry requirements vaccination becomes easier to delay or forgo entirely for individuals who face significant barriers to preventive care.[24] Crucially, mandates are not primarily designed to coerce those already inclined to vaccinate. Instead, they protect those who are least able to mitigate and opt out of exposure. The burden of this exposure falls most heavily on children, elderly individuals, and immunocompromised patients.[25] These populations depend almost entirely on herd immunity for protection. Herd immunity depends not on one person’s choice alone, but on collective participation.[26] As a result, when vaccination rates fall below critical thresholds, the risk for vulnerable populations increases regardless of their own behavior.
Florida’s proposal to eliminate vaccine mandates disrupts these structural protections. While vaccines would technically remain available, the removal of enforcement mechanisms fundamentally alters who benefits from public health protection and who is left exposed.[27]
Conclusion
Florida’s proposed elimination of vaccine mandates represents a critical turning point in public health governance. While framed as an expansion of individual freedom, the policy change redistributes health risk. The proposal exposes a structural gap in Florida’s public health law: the ability of executive actors to dismantle integrated public health protections through administrative means, even if the Legislature declines to do so. Whether courts, lawmakers, or agencies respond to this gap will shape the future of public health enforcement in an era increasingly defined by misinformation and disinformation, skepticism, and polarization. Florida’s proposal forces us to not only confront whether vaccine mandates are necessary, but who is left unprotected when those mandates disappear.
[1] Gov. DeSantis Vows to end Vaccine Mandates in Florida, Announces State MAHA Commission, FOX 13 Tampa Bay, YouTube 0:39:00 (Sep. 3, 2025), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cEyyR73Uv-g [https://perma.cc/HW2X-GFUT].
[2] Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 23, 26, 39 (1905) (holding that the state’s vaccine mandate was a valid exercise of the state’s police power and was based on prevailing medical consensus).
[3] Brian A. Smith, Public Health Law in the 21st Century: Evolution, Emerging Issues, and Equity, 65 HOWARD L. J. 353, 374 (Spring 2022).
[4] Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, When Governors Prioritize Individual Freedom over Public Health: Tort Liability for Government Failures, 37 J.L. & Health 52, 74-81 (2024).
[5] Fla. Stat. § 1003.22(3) (2025).
[6] Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 64D-3.046 (2026); Florida Department of Health, Form 150-615, Immunization Guidelines: Florida Schools, Childcare Facilities and Family Daycare Homes (2013).
[7] Fla. Stat. § 1003.22(3) (2025).
[8] Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 64D-3.046 (2026); Florida Department of Health, Form 150-615, Immunization Guidelines: Florida Schools, Childcare Facilities and Family Daycare Homes (2013).
[9] Fla. Stat. §§ 20.43, 120.536, 381.0011, 1003.22(3) (2025).
[10] Fla. Stat. §§ 20.43, 120.536, 381.0011, 1003.22(3) (2025).
[11] Fla. Stat. §§ 20.43, 381.001 (2025).
[12] Fla. Stat. §§ 120.536, 381.003, 381.005, 381.0011 (2025).
[13] Fla. Stat. § 381.0011(2)-(3) (2025).
[14] Fla. Stat. § 381.003(1)(e) (2025).
[15] Fla. Stat. § 120.536 (2025).
[16] Fla. Stat. § 1003.22(3) (2025).
[17] Fla. Stat. § 120.54 (d)(6) (2025).
[18] Fla. Stat. § 120.536 (2025).
[19] Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 325, 327 (2014) (“An agency has no power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms.”); Billauer, supra note 4, at 57.
[20] FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (“An administrative agency…may not exercise its authority ‘in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress enacted into law.’”); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 325 (2014); West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 701 (2022).
[21] See What do Vaccines Do? How Herd Immunity Works, History of Vaccines (Feb. 22, 2025), https://historyofvaccines.org/vaccines-101/what-do-vaccines-do/how-herd-immunity-works [https://perma.cc/EJ8N-MN9B].
[22] Smith, supra note 3, at 364, 376.
[23] Smith, supra note 3, at 376; Saad B. Omer, Vaccine Refusal, Mandatory Immunization, and the Risks of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 360 The New England J. of Med. 1981, 1983 (May 7, 2009).
[24] Arthur Allen, DeSantis Moves to end Florida’s Childhood Vaccination Mandates. Doctors Brace for Impact, ABC News (October 22, 2025, at 5:20 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/desantis-moves-end-floridas-childhood-vaccination-mandates-doctors/story?id=126719452#:~:text=Ladapo’s%20department%20is%20ending%20mandates,mumps%2C%20diphtheria%2C%20and%20tetanus [https://perma.cc/42SA-REEF].
[25] Nicole D. White, Vaccine Equity: Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic, 16 Pharmacy Rev. 443, 444 (2022).
[26] Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public’s Right to Health: When Patient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1335, 1343 (2009).
[27] Id. at 1343.
