By: Emily Hill
On May 23, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States released its decision in Shinn v. Ramirez, a landmark case concerning evidentiary hearings in federal habeas hearings.[1]This controversial 6-3 opinion is similar to the other cases decided this past summer as it represents a marked distinction from precedent.[2] Additionally, the case is split precisely down party lines – with conservative justices making up the majority, and liberal justices representing the minority.
The Court in Shinn v. Ramirez held that under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), incarcerated individuals in state prisons must exhaust all state remedies before seeking habeas relief in federal courts.[3] Thus, an incarcerated individual in a state prison is entitled to a post-conviction proceeding after their criminal trial. If, at this proceeding, the individual fails to raise exculpatory evidence, the claim is procedurally defaulted.[4] Procedural defaults can only be overcome in narrow circumstances and attorney error, particularly ineffective assistance of counsel, does not excuse an individual for failing to raise new evidence.[5] Because the Court held that there is no constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, the fact that the record is undeveloped is at the fault of the defendant.[6]
First, this decision will have profoundly negative consequences on indigent individuals in the future. In fact, Shinn effectively strips criminal defendants of the right to counsel, a sacred right deeply enshrined in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[7] Since most criminal cases in the United States are tried by public defenders, those that cannot afford an attorney will be most harshly punished by this ruling. Public defender systems are “chronically underfunded, poorly paid and overloaded with cases.”[8]
Second, the majority opinion in Shinn, written by Justice Clarence Thomas preys on fearmongering tactics of conservative jurisprudence. Thomas begins the opinion by describing the gruesome allegations against David Ramirez, the first criminal defendant in the consolidated cases.[9] He presents the allegations as fact, painstakingly describing the alleged method by which Ramirez stabbed his former girlfriend and daughter.[10] Thomas provides only a short discussion of whether the AEDPA bars an individual from raising new evidence in their federal habeas proceeding when that individual had ineffective assistance of counsel in both their state criminal trial and state postconviction proceeding. Instead, Thomas further recalls the murder weapons that Ramirez allegedly used in the stabbing of both women.[11] However, Justice Thomas never uses the words “alleged” or “supposedly.” Instead, Thomas recollects the incident as absolute fact. By emphasizing the bad “facts” of this case, Thomas minimized the procedural, technical parts of this case that are actually being contested.
Thomas once again employed his inflammatory tactics to illustrate the alleged facts in the other consolidated case of Barry Lee Jones. He begins the provocative illustration with a gruesome description of 4-year-old Rachel Gray’s death.[12] He not only condemns Jones and unequivocally blames him for Rachel’s death, he also details the exact mechanism by which Rachel allegedly died.[13] He states that “one blow to Rachel’s abdomen ruptured her small intestine.”[14] Thomas uses this tactic to incite the readers’ emotions, despite the fact that Mr. Jones has credible evidence which points to his innocence. Thomas fails to mention that his theory of the case is wholly contradicted by expert reports which said that Rachel’s death was actually likely caused by an earlier incident, for which Jones had no involvement. In both Jones’ and Ramirez’s cases, Thomas wasted considerable space attempting to assassinate the character of both men. This is especially repulsive in Jones’ case as he has maintained his innocence since the time of his arrest.[15]
Next, the decision is a sharp departure from precedent. In post-conviction proceedings, a wrongfully convicted individual only gets one bite at the apple, or one chance to raise new evidentiary claims to prove their innocence. The idea behind this is to allow wrongfully convicted individuals to present their truth under protections of due process of the law, usually through claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. However, there are certain exceptions to this rule. In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court held that a failure to raise exculpatory evidence in initial post-conviction proceedings may be excused when the assistance of trial counsel and post-conviction counsel are both ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment.[16] In effect, if the court finds that the counsel on direct appeal was ineffective, then the prisoner is allowed recourse in federal court to have new evidence heard. Thus, under Martinez, post-conviction relief can be found in accordance with principles of fairness and equity. Convicted prisoners may get a chance to bite the apple if the ineffective assistance of their attorney precluded them from doing so before. Shinn effectively disregards the holding in Martinez and disposes with the ability for incarcerated to get federal habeas relief if both of their attorneys were ineffective.[17]
[1] Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022).
[2] Id. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022); see also West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).
[3] See Shinn 142 S. Ct. 1718.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] See Christina Swarns, Innocence Project Statement from Executive Director Christina Swarns on Shinn v. Ramirez and Jones, The Innocence Project (May 23, 2022),https://innocenceproject.org/innocence-project-statement-from-executive-director-christina-swarns-on-shinn-v-ramirez-and-jones/.
[8] Id.
[9] See Shinn 142 S. Ct. 1718.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] See Id.
[16] See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 1313 (2012) (Holding that a procedural default of the Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act may be overcome if the post-conviction counsel was also ineffective as a way to establish cause).
[17] See Shinn 142 S. Ct. 1718.
