By: Danielle Chari
I. Introduction
The 2024 Public Lands Rule clarified that conservation is a valid use under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) by prioritizing ecosystem health and introducing tools like conservation leases alongside traditional extractive uses.[1] However, the new presidential administration changed the agency’s management and goals.[2] The Department of the Interior has now claimed that the 2024 Rule “exceeded the BLM’s statutory authority by placing an outsized priority on conservation or no-use at the expense of multiple-use access” and said repeal would “restor[e] balanced, multiple-use management.”[3] The 2025 Rescission is presented as curing that overreach. Officials argue that the 2025 Rescission will “restore[] BLM to its legal mandate” and protects economic uses such as energy development, ranching, and timber from “restrictive land-use policies.”[4]
The proposed change is not popular. The Natural Resources Defense Council emphasized that over 90% of public commenters support the 2024 Rule’s balanced approach and warned that by “dump[ing] the Public Lands Rule,” BLM is “jettison[ing] a critical mechanism that helps to ensure that conservation is on equal footing” with other uses.[5]
Aside from its unpopularity, the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) proposed rescission of the 2024 Public Lands Rule is an unlawful contraction of the agency’s conservation authority under FLPMA. Specifically, the current proposal to rescind the Rule reinterprets FLPMA’s multiple-use doctrine to elevate extractive access and marginalize conservation, despite the statutory text’s strong indication that the agency must consider both considerations.[6]
II. Delegated Authority Under FLPMA: Why the Rescission Conflicts with Statutory Limits
BLM derives its authority from the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), which provides the statutory framework for managing public lands.[7] Under FLPMA, Congress declared that public lands should be managed in a way that protects “scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values.”[8] FLPMA § 1732(a) further mandates that BLM manage lands “under principles of multiple use and sustained yield,” clearly encompassing conservation as one of the contemplated uses.[9]
This statutory delegation is grounded in the federal government’s constitutional authority under the Property Clause, which gives Congress the power to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the United States.”[10] BLM acts pursuant to that power as delegated by FLPMA.[11] However, that delegation is not limitless. Agency discretion must remain within the bounds of statutory text and purpose.
In Norton v. SUWA the Supreme Court clarified the limits of judicial review under the APA.[12] The Court held that federal courts may only compel discrete agency actions that are legally required by statute.[13] There, although FLPMA directed BLM to maintain wilderness study areas for potential future designation, but it did not specify how that duty must be carried out.[14] As a result, the Court found BLM retained discretion in implementing general policy objectives.[15] But here, unlike in SUWA, BLM is not merely choosing among permissible methods of compliance; it is seeking to erase an entire category of land use, despite FLPMA’s textual inclusion of conservation within multiple use. The agency may fill in gaps but not contradict the statutory floor.
Thus, the 2025 rescission does not reflect permissible agency discretion under FLPMA. It seeks to redefine statutory terms already defined by Congress. That is not administration; it is legislation by agency.
- Administrative Law Principles: APA Constraints
Rescinding the 2024 Public Lands Rule constitutes informal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA defines rulemaking broadly to include amending or repealing an existing rule, and such actions must comply with procedural and substantive standards.[16]
The Supreme Court held in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe that to withstand arbitrary and capricious review under the APA, BLM must present the whole administrative record, not just self-serving affidavits for its policy change, particularly where the prior rule reflected a different interpretation of FLPMA’s multiple-use mandate.[17]
In Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the agency’s interpretation because it conflicted with the statute’s purpose.[18] Although the Park Service cited historical preservation to justify motorized access, the court held this violated the Wilderness Act’s central goal of limiting human impact.[19] Likewise, here, BLM departs from FLPMA’s purpose by rescinding a rule that elevated conservation, ultimately undermining the statutory balance Congress intended.
The cause of action here would arise under Section 702 of the APA, which authorizes persons adversely affected by agency action to seek judicial review.[20] The standard of review is narrow, focused on whether the agency has engaged in reasoned decision-making.[21] Stakeholders like conservation groups, land users, or local governments could have standing if they show injury, such as reduced ecological protection or harm to conservation programs, caused by the policy change that a court can remedy. If a court were to review the rescission, there would be strong grounds to vacate the rescission and remand it to the agency for reconsideration, restoring the 2024 Rule pending proper review.
- NEPA: Is Rescinding the Rule a Major Federal Action Requiring Environmental Review?
The Supreme Court held in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council that The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of their actions before proceeding.[22] In Marsh, the Court deferred to the Army Corps of Engineers’ conclusion that new memos did not rise to the level of significance.[23] But here, unlike Marsh, where the agency’s decision was backed by scientific judgment, the Department of the Interior has provided no meaningful environmental review to support its decision to rescind the Public Lands Rule.[24]
The rescission of the 2024 Public Lands Rule qualifies as a major federal action under NEPA, as it alters the overarching management framework for more than 245 million acres of public land, therefore requiring environmental review. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court clarified that NEPA obligations are triggered when an agency has a concrete proposal for action.[25] There, the Court rejected a demand for a programmatic Environment Impact Statement (EIS) across an entire region absent a specific federal plan.[26] However, here, the rescission here is a formal, agency-wide policy shift promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking. It is not speculative or anticipatory. It is a definitive action that rolls back conservation tools across all BLM-managed lands.
Applying Marsh and Kleppe, rescinding a rule like the 2024 Public Lands Rule, which explicitly promotes resilience, habitat connectivity, and restoration without assessing the environmental consequences of its removal, contravenes NEPA’s core function.[27] As such, an EIS is warranted. Without it, the agency risks violating NEPA by committing resources to a new land management regime without first analyzing its environmental tradeoffs.
V. Federalism and Preemption: Can a State Resist the Rescission?
A state likely cannot block or override BLM’s rescission of the Public Lands Rule, as the federal government retains exclusive authority over public lands under the Property Clause of the Constitution.[28] Further, under the Supremacy Clause, valid federal land regulations preempt conflicting state law.[29] This case presents an example of conflict preemption, which occurs when state law interferes with the accomplishment of federal objectives.[30] In California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., the Court upheld limited state regulation of federal lands only where it did not frustrate federal purposes or contradict federal law.[31] But unlike Granite Rock, which involved a narrow permitting issue, the rescission of the Public Lands Rule is a broad policy reversal by a federal agency with delegated authority under FLPMA.
This case more closely resembles Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp, where the court held that state regulations could not obstruct federally authorized oil exploration on public lands.[32] Similarly, a state here could not impose conservation mandates to restore the repealed Public Lands Rule without conflicting with federal management policy.
Thus, under conflict preemption principles and the Property Clause, federal decisions to rescind or revise land use rules govern, even where state governments disagree.
- Multiple Use and Sustained Yield: Conservation as a Valid Use, and the Misinterpretation in the Rescission
FLPMA defines “multiple use” to include “a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses,” expressly naming “recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historical values.”[33] This language confirms that conservation is a legitimate use, not merely a constraint, within the multiple use framework.
The 2024 Public Lands Rule embraced this statutory balance by operationalizing conservation tools like restoration leases and ecosystem health benchmarks.[34] Its rescission reinterprets the multiple use doctrine by marginalizing non-commodity values and elevating extractive access. That shift departs from the historical trajectory of public lands management, which has evolved to integrate ecological sustainability and long-term landscape resilience.
“Balanced” in this context does not require perfect equivalence between uses, but it demands thoughtful reconciliation of competing interests to avoid dominance by any one use. As studied in forestry policy, sustained yield is not just about volume of timber or frequency of use.[35] It is about maintaining the health of the system over time. Removing conservation from the land use equation undermines this goal.
- Conclusion
Ultimately, the rescission of the Public Lands Rule not only departs from statutory text and purpose but also risks politicizing land management at the expense of legal integrity, environmental stewardship, and democratic accountability.
[1] Conservation and Landscape Health Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. 24,210 (Apr. 18, 2024) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1601, 1780, 3100, 4100).
[2] Trump Administration Moves to Repeal Landmark Public Lands Rule, Nat. Res. Def. Council
(Sept. 11, 2025), https://www.nrdc.org/press-releases/trump-administration-movesrepeal-
landmark-public-lands-rule.
[3] Interior Proposes to Rescind Public Lands Rule, Restoring Balanced, Multiple-Use Management,
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Sept. 10, 2025), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interiorproposes-
rescind-public-lands-rule-restoring-balanced-multiple-use.
[4] Id.
[5] Supra note 2.
[6] Rescission of Conservation and Landscape Health Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. 43990 (proposed Sept. 11,
2025), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/11/2025-17537/rescission-ofconservation-
and-landscape-health-rule.
[7] Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2018).
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
[11] Supra note 7.
[12] Norton v. SUWA, 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
[13] Id. at 64.
[14] Id. at 63.
[15] Id. at 73.
[16] Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2018).
[17] Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971).
[18] Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1092 (11th Cir. 2004).
[19] Id. at 1096.
[20] APA §§ 551–559, 701–706.
[21] Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419.
[22] Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989).
[23] Id. at 378.
[24] Id. at 385.
[25] Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976).
[26] Id. at 412.
[27] Id. at 412; Marsh, 490 U.S. at 375; Conservation and Landscape Health Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. 24, 210.
[28] U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
[29] Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
[30] Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
[31] California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 593 (1987).
[32] Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 1979).
[33] FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787.
[34] Conservation and Landscape Health Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. 24, 210.
[35] See U.S. Forest Serv., Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (describing sustained yield as management of renewable resources in perpetuity).
